U.S. Federal Nuclear Legislation Since 2019

Overhauled how the Nuclear Regulatory Commission charges for and budgets its work — capping annual fees on operating reactors and excluding the cost of developing future-technology rules from the fees today's plants pay. It also ordered the NRC to set firm performance metrics for licensing and to build a technology-inclusive licensing framework for non-light-water reactors by 2027.

The first comprehensive update to U.S. energy policy in over a decade. For nuclear it did three big things: formally authorized the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) to cost-share first-of-a-kind reactors, created the HALEU Availability Program to seed a domestic supply of the special fuel advanced reactors need, and authorized a versatile fast-neutron test reactor.

Directs DOE to demonstrate advanced reactor concepts (two demos by ~2025, several more designs by ~2035), stand up a versatile fast-neutron source as a national user facility, make HALEU available for R&D, and support the nuclear workforce. Enacted within the FY2021 defense bill, days after many of the same provisions passed in the Energy Act of 2020.

Put real money behind nuclear. Its Civil Nuclear Credit Program (~$6 billion) pays struggling existing reactors to stay open rather than close early; it funded the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (~$2.5 billion through FY2025, backing TerraPower and X-energy); and it required that at least one of its $8 billion in clean-hydrogen hubs use nuclear energy — opening a new revenue stream for reactors beyond selling electricity.

Best known for semiconductors, but it also authorized broad DOE nuclear and fusion research — roughly $390 million (FY2023–FY2027) to build new university research reactors and isotope facilities, funding to modernize existing university reactors, and major fusion authorizations (materials, pilot-plant design teams, ITER). Note: these are authorizations — ceilings that still need annual appropriations to spend.

Gave nuclear its strongest-ever federal economics. Section 45U is a production tax credit (up to ~$15/MWh) for existing plants through 2032 — effectively a price floor that protects reactors when wholesale power prices crash. Sections 45Y/48E are technology-neutral credits for new clean power (a production credit or an investment credit worth up to ~50% of capital cost with bonuses) that apply to new nuclear. It also added $700 million for the domestic HALEU supply chain.

Directs DOE to build a domestic nuclear-fuel supply chain so the U.S. stops depending on Russia. It establishes a Nuclear Fuel Security Program, sets targets for making HALEU available (at least 10 metric tons by mid-2026, 20 MT by end of 2027), and expands the American Assured Fuel Supply. Crucially, it makes DOE act as a guaranteed first customer so private enrichers can finance new centrifuge plants.

Best known for Ukraine and Israel aid, this supplemental also appropriated up to ~$2.72 billion for the domestic uranium and HALEU supply chain — but Congress conditioned the money on first banning Russian uranium imports. DOE later awarded these funds across 2024–2026 for enrichment, deconversion, and HALEU contracts.

Bans imports of unirradiated low-enriched uranium from Russia, closing swap and third-country loopholes. To avoid sudden fuel shortages, DOE can grant declining waivers through 2027 where no alternative supply exists — but all waivers must end by January 1, 2028, producing an effective full ban. Restrictions run through 2040.

The most consequential civilian nuclear law of the period. It cuts NRC licensing fees for advanced reactors (an FY2025 rule roughly halved the hourly rate), creates 'prize' awards reimbursing first-of-a-kind licensing costs, lets the NRC hire up to 210 extra staff outside normal civil-service limits, speeds up environmental reviews and brownfield/retired-coal siting, sets up a fusion regulatory framework, and rewrites the NRC's mission so regulation does not 'unnecessarily limit' the use of nuclear energy.

Would require the affirmative consent of state, local, and tribal governments before siting a nuclear-waste repository or storage facility — a deliberate break from the top-down approach that doomed Yucca Mountain in Nevada.

Would amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to set priorities for which sites DOE removes spent fuel from first — ranking by reactor status (shut-down plants first), nearby population, seismic hazard, and security risk.

Four executive orders aiming to roughly quadruple U.S. nuclear capacity (toward ~400 GW by 2050). They direct: deploying reactors for military bases and AI data centers (EO 14299); forcing fixed NRC licensing deadlines and a staff overhaul (EO 14300); steering advanced-reactor testing to DOE with a goal of three pilot reactors reaching criticality by July 4, 2026 (EO 14301); and reinvigorating the industrial base, including getting 10 large reactors under construction by 2030 (EO 14302).

A sweeping reconciliation law that treated energy credits asymmetrically: it terminated wind and solar credits after 2027 but preserved the nuclear ones. New nuclear keeps the 45Y/48E credits if it begins construction before 2034 (then phasing down), with advanced reactors getting extra runway and a new 10% bonus for 'nuclear energy communities.' It also lets advanced-nuclear generators use Master Limited Partnership structures from 2026 (the tax-advantaged setup long enjoyed by oil and gas), while adding Foreign Entity of Concern restrictions. Separately, it enacted the largest-ever expansion of the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) — raising payments to $100,000 and broadening coverage for downwinders, uranium workers, and Manhattan Project waste communities.

A study bill: it would direct DOE to thoroughly assess the costs, benefits, risks, and barriers of recycling spent nuclear fuel — including extracting medical isotopes — versus simply storing it.

Would make it easier to license facilities that recycle used nuclear fuel. It amends the Atomic Energy Act so that a device that reprocesses spent fuel without separating out pure plutonium isn't treated as a heavily regulated 'production facility,' letting these plants license under the lighter NRC Part 70 process instead.

Directs DOE's national labs to apply AI and high-performance computing to scientific discovery, naming nuclear energy as a flagship challenge — including a 'Prometheus' effort (with Idaho National Laboratory and NVIDIA) to cut reactor design and licensing timelines by up to 50%.

Would expand DOE's advanced-reactor demonstration program to cover Generation-IV reactors, small modular reactors, and microreactors more explicitly, broadening the kinds of designs eligible for federal demonstration support.

The annual defense bill carried the International Nuclear Energy Act, which builds a U.S. strategy to export reactors and compete with Russia's Rosatom and China abroad. It creates a Nuclear Exports Working Group and a 10-year civil-nuclear trade strategy with export targets, directs renegotiation of expiring Section 123 cooperation agreements, and authorizes assistance (up to ~$15.5M/yr through 2030) to nations newly 'embarking' on nuclear power.

Would write President Trump's May 2025 nuclear executive orders into permanent law — most notably the fixed NRC licensing deadlines (18 months for new builds, 12 months for renewals) — so they survive a future change of administration.

Codified the 119th Congress's nuclear funding priorities: roughly $1.8 billion for DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, and a large reprogramming (~$5.1 billion of unobligated clean-energy funds, with ~$3.1 billion redirected to nuclear) toward reactor demonstrations and small-modular-reactor awards. It also capitalized the rebranded Office of Energy Dominance Financing (formerly the Loan Programs Office) to back loans for new commercial reactors.

Acting on the executive orders, DOE issued Requests for Applications to demonstrate commercial-scale recycling of defense-related used fuel at Idaho (INTEC) and to convert ~20 metric tons of surplus weapons plutonium into advanced-reactor fuel (the Surplus Plutonium Utilization Program), alongside the Reactor Pilot Program (three test reactors to criticality by July 4, 2026) and UPRISE (~5 GW of uprates by 2029).

Would create a clear DOE-led pathway to authorize commercial reactors and fuel-cycle facilities on federal land — a 'Nuclear Energy Launch Pad' of designated test-and-demonstration sites — and clarify DOE's authority over privately sponsored reactor projects. It also contains provisions to repurpose surplus weapons plutonium as advanced-reactor fuel.

Would direct the NRC to write rules allowing ordinary commercial-grade concrete and steel in the non-safety-related parts of a nuclear plant, instead of requiring expensive 'nuclear-grade' (NQA-1) materials everywhere. The reactor's safety-critical containment boundary would keep its strict standards.

The U.S. still has no operating permanent repository: Yucca Mountain remains authorized but unfunded, and used fuel keeps accumulating at reactor sites. The current consent-based siting bills and spent-fuel prioritization bills are widely seen as down-payments on a larger, still-unwritten overhaul of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The administration's headline goals — ~400 GW of nuclear by 2050, 10 large reactors under construction by 2030 — currently rest on executive orders and appropriations, not durable statute. Expect continued legislative attempts to lock in licensing timelines, financing authority, and demonstration programs so the build-out survives political transitions.